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The Chapeau: Stringent Threshold or Good
Faith Requirement
Christian RIFFEL*
The international trading order has lately come under increased pressure: the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) struggles to pass ratification; the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations are stalled; and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been downsized. The overarching issue is to find the right
balance between trade liberalization, on the one hand, and non-trade values, on the other
hand. Critics of the current system point out that the law as it stands emphasizes excessive
trade liberalization to the detriment of the regulatory autonomy of national lawmakers. The
author submits that the key clause affecting the entire system is the introductory clause of the
general exceptions: the chapeau. This clause also features in free trade agreements (FTAs)
and international investment agreements, as it is common practice to draw on the language of
the WTO Agreement. The interpretative conflict pivots around two extremes: On one end
of the spectrum, the chapeau is read as a stringent threshold requirement, thus reducing the
policy space of states to regulate public welfare matters. On the other end, the chapeau
reaffirms the tenet of good faith, which guides the performance of every treaty in any event.
The author argues that the meaning of the chapeau should be clarified by negotiators in
future FTAs, such as RCEP, with a view to curtailing its restrictive clout while maintaining
its potential to promote good governance, notably administrative due process, and advances a
concrete proposal to this effect.
1 INTRODUCTION
The international trading order has lately come under increased pressure: The
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)1 struggles to pass
ratification in the European Union; the negotiations for a Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are stalled; and the United
States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a result of which
the remaining signatories rebranded the agreement as the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and agreed to
suspend certain provisions, particularly in relation to the protection of foreign
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1 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and the European
Union and its Member States, of the other part (signed 30 Oct. 2016).
investment and intellectual property.2 As always, the overarching issue is to
find the right balance between trade liberalization, on the one hand, and non-
trade values, on the other hand. Critics of the current system point out that
the law as it stands emphasizes excessive trade liberalization to the detriment
of the regulatory autonomy of national lawmakers. Instead of promoting
world peace, liberalization is even seen as a threat to democratic processes.3
The author submits that the key clause of the entire system is the introductory
clause of the general exceptions: the so-called chapeau. Exceptions are the stage of
the legal analysis when the conflict of competing societal interests comes to a head,
and the chapeau is the final hurdle a government measure must clear before it is
found WTO-compliant. The chapeau thus fine-tunes the delicate balance between
domestic policy space and the Members’ obligations.
The clause is not only of relevance to theWTOAgreement,4 but also resurfaces
in free trade agreements (FTAs), as it is common practice to model FTA general
exceptions on the ones contained in the WTO Agreement. Rules of interpretation,
such as Article 29.17, second sentence, CETA or Article 28.12.3, second sentence,
TPP, ensure that the exceptions in those agreements are interpreted in line with
WTO case law. Besides, the use of chapeau language is not limited to general
exceptions. For instance, the Treaty of Waitangi exception in the CPTPP contains
a chapeau-like clause.5 Furthermore, states increasingly use general exceptions,
including chapeau language, in investment chapters6 and bilateral investment treaties
(BITs).7 So the risk is that problems are imported from the trade arena into the
investment arena.
2 For a list of the suspended provisions, see New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-tra
de-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/cptpp-2/ (accessed 12 Feb. 2018).
3 See e.g. International Trade Union Confederation, Statement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP) 2 (Press Release, 2 Feb. 2016), https://www.ituc-csi.org/statement-on-the-trans-pacific?lan
g=en (accessed 12 Feb. 2018).
4 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into
force 1 Jan. 1995) 1867 UNTS 154 (WTO Agreement).
5 Art. 29.6.1 TPP.
6 See e.g. Art. 14.15 of the Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (entered into force 15 Jan.
2015); Art. 9.8.1 of the Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China (entered into force 20 Dec. 2015); Art. 9.3.3 of the
Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore; Art. 28.3.2
CETA.
7 See e.g. Art. 16(1) of the Brazil Model BIT 2015; Art. 5(2) of the AzerbaijanModel BIT 2016; Art. 17(1)
of the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments (entered into force 6 Sept. 2016); Art. 17(1) of the Agreement between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (entered into force 9 Dec. 2013); Art. 14(2) of the Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Republic of Zambia on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 7 Sept. 2005).
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The chapeau is rife with ambiguity, which has been lamented since thefirst case was
brought before the World Trade Organization.8 The interpretative conflict revolves
around two extremes: On one end of the spectrum, the chapeau is read as a stringent
threshold requirement, thus reducing the policy space of states to regulate public welfare
matters. On the other end, the chapeau reaffirms the tenet of good faith, which guides
the performance of every treaty in any event.9 It is worth calling tomind that only in one
case did a respondent ever succeed by invoking a general exception, to wit: in
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia).10 In many cases, the respondents’ defence
foundered on the chapeau.11 So it is high time to address the ambiguity of the chapeau
and to elaborate workable definitions.
The author argues that negotiators of FTAs, instead of blindly incorporatingWTO
language, should rather take the opportunity to clarify the meaning of the chapeau in
light of newWTO jurisprudence. Negotiators are naturally hesitant to tinker with well-
established General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) language, unless there is a
cogent reason.12 As far as the chapeau is concerned, this is the case. In the author’s view,
the chapeau constitutes a good faith caveat foreclosing arbitrary rule-making, not a
stringent threshold requirement. Lorand Bartels recently put forward a proposal to
reconstruct the chapeau.13 The present article seeks to carry the discussion forward and
espouses a middle course somewhat between the approach taken by the Appellate Body
andBartels’proposal. The authormakes a case that ‘discrimination’ and ‘restriction’ in the
chapeau refer to the respective substantive obligations (prohibition of discrimination and
market access), making ‘arbitrary’, ‘unjustifiable’ and ‘disguised’ the operative words.
The terms ‘discrimination’ and ‘restriction’ in the chapeau connect the general excep-
tions to the concept of trade barriers, namely discriminatory and/or restrictive measures.
‘Restriction’ is the broader concept and encompasses ‘discrimination’.14 The author
8 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/
AB/R, 20 May 1996, at 23.
9 Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into force
27 Jan. 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). See Appellate Body Report, United States – Transitional
Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R, 5 Nov. 2001, para. 81,
affirming that good faith ‘underlies all treaties’.
10 Appellate Body Report,United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, 21 Nov. 2001, para. 152. In the EC –
Asbestos case, already the infringement (of Art. III:4 GATT) was negated by the Appellate Body,
European Communities –Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R,
5 Apr. 2001, paras 132, 148.
11 For an overview, seeNiall Moran,The First Twenty Cases Under GATTArticle XX: Tuna or ShrimpDear?,
in International Economic Law: Contemporary Issues 10, 13 (Giovanna Adinolfi & others eds, Springer
2017).
12 Cf. David Collins,The Line of Equilibrium: Improving the Legitimacy of Investment Treaty Arbitration Through
the Application of the WTO’s General Exceptions, 32 Arb. Int’l 575, 581 f (2016).
13 Lorand Bartels, The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A
Reconstruction, 109 Am. J. Int’l. L. 95 (2015).
14 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 25.
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further pleads that the pivotal element of the chapeau is an arbitrariness test and contends
that its other elements, ‘unjustifiable’ and ‘disguised’, can either be subsumed thereunder
or have not proven relevant in practice.
Section 2 explicates the ratio legis of the chapeau, before section 3 parses its
elements. In particular, section 3 elaborates an arbitrariness test that is accommodat-
ing of other rules of international law. Section 4 answers the question in which order
those elements should be analysed, and section 5 deals with the burden of proof. In
section 3–5 the article also critiques the most recent application of the chapeau in
Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes.15 It illustrates the current state of affairs. Sections
6 and 7 then explore the potential the chapeau has to ensure administrative due
process and good governance in the Members. Section 8 appraises ideas to curtail its
clout and suggests to rework its wording for use in FTAs under negotiation, such as
RCEP. Section 9 finally concludes and advances a concrete proposal to this effect
which draws on European Union law. The aim is not to replace the chapeau, but to
phrase it more precisely.
2 RATIO LEGIS OF THE CHAPEAU
2.1 SCHRANKEN-SCHRANKE
For a government measure to pass muster under a general exception, be it Article XX
of the GATT16 or Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS),17 it must come under one of the listed grounds of justification as well as
satisfy the requirements of the chapeau.18 Systematically, the chapeau constitutes a
limitation on a limitation, a Schranken-Schranke, just like the necessity test, because it
attaches conditions to the Members’ right to regulate as guaranteed in the exceptions
(‘a limited and conditional exception’).19 In doing so, it serves to limit the ‘trade
distortive effects’ of an otherwise legitimate measure.20
15 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products,
WT/DS477/AB/R, WT/DS478/AB/R, 22 Nov.. 2017.
16 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 Jan. 1995)
1867 UNTS 187.
17 General Agreement on Trade in Services (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 Jan. 1995) 1869
UNTS 183.
18 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 22.
19 Cf. Appellate Body Report,United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R, 6 Nov. 1998, para. 157 (emphasis in original).
20 Padideh Ala’i, Transparency and the Expansion of the WTOMandate, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1009, 1025
(2011).
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2.2 ABUSE OF RIGHTS
According to the Appellate Body, the application of the chapeau is guided by the
tenet of abuse of rights, which emanates from the principle of good faith.21
Exceptions (and the ensuing policy space) must not be misused by the Members
for protectionist purposes. Following this, and in light of the history of the clause,22
which may be taken into account as a supplementary means of interpretation,23 the
ratio legis of the chapeau is to sift out protectionism in the guise of public welfare
measures.24 In the words of the Appellate Body: ‘The task of interpreting and
applying the chapeau is … the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article
XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions’25
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also provides
for a two-tier test under its general exceptions and uses similar language.26 In the
same vein, the pertinent Articles 36, second sentence, and 65(3) TFEU establish a
prohibition of abuse of the rights of EU Member States in the enumerated policy
fields for the benefit of fundamental freedoms.27 It bears noting, however, that the
whole WTO system is geared towards restraining protectionism. The chapeau is just
another hoop that a government measure would have to jump through. So it is
questionable whether the above finding assists in the interpretive process, given that
the performance of the entire WTO Agreement must be governed by good faith.
The dictum of the Appellate Body is not only true of the chapeau.28 By the same
token, an arbitral tribunal held that ‘every rule of law includes an implied clause that
it should not be abused’.29 The proposition that the chapeau embodies abus de droit
does not tell us how to flesh out its elements. This will occupy our attention
21 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 22, 25; Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 158;
Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 5.95. See also Charles Kotuby Jr. &
Luke Sobota, General Principles of Law and International Due Process: Principles and Norms Applicable in
Transnational Disputes 107–113 (OUP 2017).
22 For a brief history of the chapeau, see Ala’i, supra n. 20, at 1022–1027.
23 Art. 3.2.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 Jan.
1995) 1869 UNTS 401 (DSU) in conjunction with Art. 32 VCLT.
24 Robert Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes, Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the
WTO After Seal Products, 48 Geo. Wash. Intl L. Rev. 81, 87, 118–120 (2015).
25 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 159.
26 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (signed 13 Dec. 2007, entered into force 1 Dec.
2009) [2008] OJ C115/47.
27 Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Artikel 36 AEUV, in Europäisches Unionsrecht para. 160 (Hans von der
Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze & Armin Hatje eds, 7 ed., Nomos 2015); Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Artikel 65
AEUV, in Europäisches Unionsrecht para. 28 (Hans von der Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze & Armin Hatje
eds, 7th ed., Nomos 2015).
28 See also Bartels, supra n. 13, at 102–104.
29 Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5) (Award, 15 Apr. 2009), para. 107.
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hereinafter. But regardless of its exact scope, the chapeau contains the political
message that arbitrary and disguised restrictions are not tolerated.
3 ELEMENTS OF THE CHAPEAU
The legal text of the chapeau has three components: (1) arbitrary or (2) unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like/the same conditions prevail, or (3) a
disguised restriction on international trade.30 It should be borne in mind at the outset
that trade effects, i.e. volumes of imports and exports, are immaterial.31 The panel in
US – Gambling examined all three components together.32 Lo criticizes such an
approach and promotes instead a distinct scope of application for the various
elements of the chapeau.33 The author argues that the criteria ‘arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination’ can be conflated to one single test, as was recently done by the
panel in Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes.34 Moreover, the author makes the case
that, firstly, the concept of ‘restriction’ embraces the concept of ‘discrimination’, and
secondly, that both elements do not add anything to the finding of an infringement.
As a result, the adjectives ‘arbitrary’ and ‘disguised’ are the operative words and apply
to both trade-restrictive and discriminatory measures. Besides, the reference to
discrimination in the chapeau could be expunged without altering its scope.
3.1 DISCRIMINATION
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body took the view that:
in order for a measure to be applied in a manner which constitutes ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’, three elements must
exist: First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination … Second, the
discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character … Third, this discrimination
must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail.35
30 Appellate Body Report,US –Gasoline, at 23; Appellate Body Report,US – Shrimp, para. 150. Art. XIV
GATS refers to ‘like conditions’ instead of ‘the same conditions’. When this article refers to the latter in
the following, this also includes the former.
31 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 17
Dec. 2007, para. 229.
32 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/R, 20 Apr. 2005, para. 6.608, upheld by the Appellate Body, paras 348–351.
33 Chang-Fa Lo, The Proper Interpretation of ‘Disguised Restriction on International Trade’Under the WTO: The
Need to Look at the Protective Effect J.I.D.s. 111, 122–125 (2012).
34 Panel Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, WT/DS477/
R, WT/DS478/R, modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, 22 Dec. 2016, para.
7.565. This aspect was not under appeal.
35 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 150 (emphasis in original).
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The Appellate Body further noted that ‘discrimination’ within the meaning of the
chapeau differs from the most-favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment
obligations.36
3.1[a] Between Countries Where the Same Conditions Prevail
The Appellate Body observed in US – Shrimp that ‘discrimination results not only
when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated’;37
discrimination may also occur ‘when the same measure is applied to countries
where different conditions prevail’.38 Reading the legal text, one might think that,
with respect to the substantive obligations, the comparison is between products (‘the
like product’) whereas, as far as the chapeau is concerned, the comparison is between
countries.39 In fact, what is being compared is not the conditions prevailing in
different countries but the competitive relationships of products.40 The panel in
Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes recalled that the ‘measures affect the competitive
opportunities of importers and imported goods’ and concluded that ‘this shows that
there is discrimination between domestic and imported goods in the sense of that
prohibited by the chapeau of Article XX’.41 Davies remarks that ‘If the products are
“like”, this can be a sufficient basis for finding that prevailing conditions between
countries are the same.’42 In both cases the discrimination is grounded on nationality:
the origin of the product.43 In a nutshell, the same conditions prevail when the
products originating from the complainant(s) and the respondent compete in the
same market.44 The element of ‘between countries where the same conditions
prevail’ embodies what is a precondition for any claim of discrimination, namely
comparability: one can only find discrimination between two situations if they are
comparable.45 The European Court of Justice, for instance, defines the principle of
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., para. 165.
38 Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 596 (4th
ed., CUP 2017); Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau & Julia Reinaud, The Interface between the Trade and
Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues, 46 J. World Trade 485, 510, 515 (2012); Appellate Body
Report, US – Shrimp, para. 177.
39 In this sense, Joost Pauwelyn, AndrewGuzman& Jennifer Hillman, International Trade Law 440 (3rd ed.,
Wolters Kluwer 2016).
40 Bartels, supra n. 13, at 110 f, 124.
41 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 7.813 (not appealed).
42 Arwel Davies, Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the ‘New’ Approach in Brazil-Tyres,
43 J. World Trade 507, 513 (2009).
43 See ibid., at 509.
44 See Bartels, supra n. 13, at 110.
45 Cf. Mitsuo Matsushita & others, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 620 (3rd ed.,
OUP 2015).
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non-discrimination in the following terms: ‘comparable situations must not be
treated differently and… different situations must not be treated in the same way’.46
3.1[b] Relationship to Substantive Obligations
According to its own wording, a measure may still pass the chapeau test, even if
found discriminatory under the chapeau, provided the discrimination is neither
arbitrary nor unjustifiable.47 Conversely, if a measure is considered arbitrary (or
unjustifiable), it does not matter whether it is also discriminatory. The measure
would founder on the chapeau in any event. As highlighted by Gaines with respect
to theUS – Shrimp ruling, ‘Those who received certificationwere, after all, subject to
the same non-transparent process as the others.’48 Van den Bossche and Zdouc
underline that ‘the chapeau … does not prohibit discrimination per se, but rather
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’.49 Ergo, the crucial question is if the measure
is applied in an arbitrary/unjustifiable manner. We will see later that this entails the
requirement of the uniform administration of the measure at issue. As a side note, in
investment law, the prohibition of ‘arbitrary or discriminatory measures’ often
belongs to one single standard.50
One way to read the chapeau would be to relate the discrimination test
to the corresponding substantive provisions. As a corollary, ‘discrimination’
within the chapeau would have the same meaning as in the combined MFN
and national treatment obligations.51 Hence, the test applied to a national
treatment/MFN violation would be if the discrimination was ‘arbitrary’ (or
‘unjustifiable’ for that matter). This raises the question of whether such a
reading would be at odds with the interpretive principle of effectiveness, as
suggested by the Appellate Body: ‘The provisions of the chapeau cannot
logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive
rule has been determined to have occurred.’52 To criticize the above result
on the basis of effet utile is the same as criticizing that the words ‘international
46 Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613, para. 31, regarding Art. 18
TFEU.
47 Bartels, supra n. 13, at 97.
48 Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on
Environmental Measures, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 739, 824 (2001).
49 Van den Bossche & Zdouc, supra n. 38, at 595 (emphasis in original). In the same vein, Bartels, supra n.
13, at 115 f.
50 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 263 (2d ed., OUP 2015); Jarrod Hepburn, Domestic
Law in International Investment Arbitration 31 (OUP 2017). See e.g. Art. 2(3) of the German Model BIT
(2008).
51 Arts I, III GATT, Arts II, XVII GATS.
52 Appellate Body Report, US –Gasoline, at 23, confirmed in Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para.
150.
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trade’ in the chapeau are not given sufficient meaning. As pointed out by
Bartels, there is no issue if ‘discrimination’ is read together with the attribu-
tive adjectives, for these distinguish the chapeau from the infringement
analysis.53 Whether ‘discrimination’ within the chapeau has an independent
scope (separate from the found infringement) depends on how the measure at
issue is being delineated. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, were the court injunc-
tions allowing the importation of used tyres part of the import ban (in the
form of an exception to the ban) or a separate measure violating the national
treatment obligation?54 The Appellate Body assumed the former.55
In this connection, it is worth noting that the Appellate Body in
EC – Seal Products equated the substantive test with the non-discrimination
test in the chapeau. The Appellate Body stated in that case that ‘the causes of
the “discrimination” found to exist under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 are
the same as those to be examined under the chapeau’, and then turned to the
question of ‘whether such discrimination is “arbitrary or unjustifiable” within
the meaning of the chapeau’.56 The Appellate Body also clarified that the
same is not true of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement):57 ‘the Panel erred in applying the same legal test to
the chapeau of Article XX as it applied under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement’.58 Because the TBT Agreement does not have a general excep-
tion provision along the lines of Article XX GATT, the legal analysis has to
be structured differently thereunder.59 Conversely, according to the Appellate
Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico), a violation of the
chapeau is tantamount to a finding of uneven-handedness under Article 2.1
TBT Agreement, and would thus amount to ‘treatment no less favourable’: ‘a
measure that involves “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” would not be
designed and applied in an “even-handed manner”’.60
53 Bartels, supra n. 13, at 110, 120.
54 On this issue see Davies, supra n. 42, at 534.
55 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, paras 240–252.
56 Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, 18 Jun. 2014, para. 5.318.
57 WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (signed 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 Jan. 1995)
1868 UNTS 120.
58 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.313.
59 For a discussion of Art. 2.1 TBT Agreement, in particular the even-handedness test, see Gracia Marín
Durán, Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes After EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a Conflict Between
GATT Article XX-Chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, 19 J. Int’l Econ. L. 467, 482–489 (2016).
60 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, WT/DS381/AB/RW, 3 Dec. 2015,
para. 7.31.
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In the final analysis, the principle of effectiveness is heeded because the
expression ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ as a whole is given mean-
ing and effect. That is all that a proper reading of effectiveness demands.61
3.2 UNJUSTIFIABLE
The Appellate Body assumed an unjustifiable discrimination in US – Shrimp because
the respondent negotiated a plurilateral solution with some Members, but not the
complainants.62 Another example of unjustifiable discrimination is given when a
Member imposes differing transition periods on exporters from other Members to
comply with a new domestic rule.63 That said, every state conduct falling under the
heading ‘unjustifiable’ can be subsumed under an arbitrariness test. It seems artificial
to distinguish between ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unjustifiable’; both concepts can be
conflated.64 Neither in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres65 nor in EC – Seal Products66 did
the Appellate Body actually differentiate between the two.
As early as in US – Gasoline did the Appellate Body acknowledge that the
requirements of the chapeau ‘may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart
meaning to one another’.67 The Appellate Body observed in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
that ‘Analyzing whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable usually involves
an analysis that relates primarily to the cause or the rationale of the discrimination.’68
That is, the same criteria apply. Whether a particular measure is unjustifiable is the
crux of any exception. Davies stresses that ‘the chapeau is designed to uncover
country-based discrimination, which, by definition, is “unjustifiable”’.69 The
word ‘unjustifiable’ could and should, therefore, be omitted from FTA exceptions.
Incidentally, the terms ‘arbitrary’, ‘unjustified’ and ‘unreasonable’ are used inter-
changeably in international investment agreements.70 In sum, the test under the
chapeau is one of arbitrariness. We will turn to this element next.
61 See Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R,
12 Jan. 2000, para. 81: ‘a treaty interpreter must read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that
gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously’ (emphasis in original).
62 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 172. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article
21.5 – Malaysia), paras 122 f.
63 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras 173 f.
64 Pro Davies, supra n. 42, at 522, 538. See also Bartels, supra n. 13, at 121, 123.
65 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 232.
66 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.328.
67 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 25. See also Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia
Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade 670 (4th ed., Routledge 2013).
68 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 225.
69 Davies, supra n. 42, at 538.
70 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 191 (2d ed., OUP 2012).
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3.3 ARBITRARY
3.3[a] Definition
To be operational, the concept of arbitrariness must be fleshed out. In short,
‘arbitrary’ purports that no reasonable explanation can be given for the mea-
sure. This follows from the dictionary meaning of the term, inferences drawn
from other WTO provisions, as well as a comparison with EU and investment
law. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘arbitrary’ as follows: ‘1. Depending on
individual discretion; of, relating to, or involving a determination made with-
out consideration of or regard for facts, circumstances, fixed rules, or proce-
dures. 2. (Of a judicial decision) founded on prejudice or preference rather than
on reason or fact.’71 Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason call measures arbitrary that
are ‘patently unreasonable’.72 The term ‘reasonable’, in turn, appears in Article
X:3(a) GATT. The panel in Dominican Republic – Import and Sales of Cigarettes
defined that term as meaning ‘in accordance with reason, not irrational or
absurd, proportionate, having sound judgement’.73 As will be seen hereinafter,
the Appellate Body harnesses the requirements of Article X:3(a) GATT to
concretize the chapeau in light of the fact that the concepts of arbitrariness
and reasonableness overlap. The Appellate Body held that ‘whenever the
assertion of a right “impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it
must be exercised … reasonably”’;74 furthermore, ‘the measures falling within
the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably’.75
For instance, pursuant to Article VI:4(a) GATS, ‘measures relating to
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing
requirements’ are to be ‘based on objective and transparent criteria, such as
competence and the ability to supply the service’.76 Likewise, in European
Union law, a measure is considered arbitrary if no objective reasons can be
given for it or there are no reasons at all.77 In this context, it is also worth
looking at arbitral decisions with a view to comparing how those forums have
tackled the concept of arbitrariness,78 mindful that remedies in international
71 Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed., Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2014).
72 Trebilcock, Howse & Eliason, supra n. 67, at 690.
73 Panel Report, Dominican Republic –Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/
DS302/R, 19 May 2005, para. 7.385.
74 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 158 (emphasis added).
75 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 22 (emphasis added).
76 Emphasis added.
77 Müller-Graff, supra n. 27, paras 166 f; Wojcik, supra n. 27, para. 30; Jürgen Bröhmer, Art. 65 AEUV, in
EUV/AEUV para. 52 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds, 5th ed., C.H. Beck 2016).
78 For this comparative approach in general, see Andrew Mitchell, Elizabeth Sheargold & Tania Voon,
Good Governance Obligations in International Economic Law: A Comparative Analysis of Trade and Investment,
17 J.W.I.T. 7, 44 f (2016).
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investment law are retrospective79 and that the complainant is a private
entity. International investment law provides for protection from arbitrary
policies, too, either under the fair and equitable treatment standard or as an
idiosyncratic treaty standard.80 One arbitral tribunal saw arbitrary conduct
given when the respondent did not engage ‘in a rational decision-making
process’.81 Another held that, under the heading of arbitrariness, ‘The sole
inquiry … is whether or not there was a manifest lack of reasons for the
legislation.’82 Hence, pronouncements of arbitral tribunals seem to confirm
that arbitrariness segues into the concept of reasonableness. The tribunal in
National Grid v. Argentina explicitly stated so: ‘the plain meaning of the terms
“unreasonable” and “arbitrary” is substantially the same’.83
Over the years, case law has developed particular categories of state conduct
deemed to be arbitrary. We will examine those momentarily, as they provide guidance
to treaty interpreters.
3.3[b] Examples
3.3[b][i] No Due Regard for Other Members’ Interests
The chapeau forces Members to have due regard to foreign interests when adopting or
enforcing a government measure.84 Two examples illustrate this: US – Shrimp and
EC – Seal Products. In both cases the respondent did not take sufficient account of the
interests of the complainants: harvesting interests in the former, indigenous interests in
the latter. As a result, the Appellate Body found arbitrariness.85 This duty to have due
regard to foreign interests does not go so far, however, as to impel states to negotiate a
multilateral solution.86
Investment law corroborates that. According to the arbitral tribunal in LG&E v.
Argentina, a rational decision-making process ‘would include a consideration of the effect of a
measure on foreign investments and a balance of the interests of the State with any burden
79 Art. 36 UN ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GAOR 56th
Session Supp. 10, 43 (2001).
80 Salacuse, supra n. 50, at 261–263; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra n. 70, at 194 f.
81 LG&E v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1) (Decision on Liability, 3 Oct. 2006), para. 158.
82 Glamis Gold v. USA (Award, 8 Jun. 2009), para. 805, confirmed in Philip Morris v. Uruguay (ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7) (Award, 8 Jul. 2016), para. 399.
83 National Grid v. Argentina (Award, 3 Nov. 2008), para. 197.
84 Michael Ioannidis, A Procedural Approach to the Legitimacy of International Adjudication: Developing
Standards of Participation in WTO Law, 12 German L. J. 1175, 1197, 1199 (2011).
85 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 177; Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para.
5.337.
86 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 123.
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imposed on such investments’.87 Pope & Talbot v. Canada would be another pertinent
example from investment law.88
3.3[b][ii] No Due Regard to Relevant Facts
The US – Shrimp case would fall into this category. The arbitrariness test compels a
Member to recognize comparably effective measures taken by other Members to
achieve the same public welfare objective.89 It should be noted that comparable
effectiveness is less than identical effectiveness. Another case in point is Dominican
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes. There the panel criticized the respondent for
disregarding the ‘retail selling prices of imported cigarettes’ when determining ‘the
tax base for the application of the tax on cigarettes’.90
3.3[b][iii] Bad Faith
Moreover, discrimination is arbitrary if done deliberately. The Appellate Body sta-
ted – under the heading of unjustifiable discrimination – that ‘The resulting discrimi-
nation must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable.’91 In
Genin v. Estonia, the arbitral tribunal held that, for a finding of arbitrariness, ‘any
procedural irregularity that may have been present would have to amount to bad faith,
a wilful disregard of due process of law or an extreme insufficiency of action’.92 This
test seems stricter than the one applied by other tribunals. There can be no doubt that
such extreme cases would be covered by the purview of arbitrariness.
A finding of bad faith is extremely rare, however, as it would presuppose that
the respondent applied the measure with the intention to harm foreign interests.
To the author’s knowledge, such a finding was neither handed down in a trade93
nor in an investment dispute.94 The Appellate Body in US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) clarified that ‘Nothing, however, in the covered agreements supports
the conclusion that simply because a WTO Member is found to have violated a
substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not acted in good faith. In our view, it
would be necessary to prove more than mere violation to support such a
87 LG&E v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), para. 158 (emphasis added).
88 Pope & Talbot v. Canada (Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 Apr. 2001), paras 177–179.
89 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 144.
90 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.388.
91 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 28. See also Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the
Export of Bovine Hides and Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, 16 Feb. 2001, paras
11.324–11.330.
92 Genin v. Estonia (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2) (Award, 25 Jun. 2001), para. 371.
93 Matsushita & others, supra n. 45, at 63.
94 Salacuse, supra n. 50, at 266.
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conclusion.’95 In the present context, an infringement has already been found.
Otherwise, an adjudicatory body would not get to the chapeau stage. What is
more, following the order of analysis endorsed by the Appellate Body, the question
of whether the measure at issue pursues a legitimate public welfare objective has
been answered in the affirmative. A hypothetical example might be the selective
application of import control measures that are, in principle, justified.96
3.3[c] Measures with Competing Purposes
We said in the foregoing that ‘arbitrary’means that no reasonable explanation can be
given for the measure at issue. A textbook example would be: a respondent pretends
that the measure at issue has a policy objective falling under an exception; in truth,
the measure was adopted for protectionist reasons, that is, the measure has a rationale
different from the one stated. In this regard, it is disputed whether an explanation is
only to be found reasonable if it is related to a listed ground of justification or whether
other (legitimate) explanations can also thwart a claim of arbitrariness.
The first view was advanced by the Appellate Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres and
then softened inEC – Seal Products. InBrazil –Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body found
a violation of the chapeau because the explanation given had ‘no rational connection to
the objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that
objective’.97 On that basis, the ‘rational connection’ requirement is the criterion to
determine arbitrariness. In EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body opined that ‘the
relationship of the discrimination to the objective of a measure is one of the most
important factors, but not the sole test, that is relevant to the assessment of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination’.98 In otherwords, other unrelated factors may be relevant to
the assessment of whether regulatory distinctions are arbitrary. Still, this approach has
been criticized in the literature for not being deferential enough towards the delicate
weighing of competing interests performed by national legislatures.99 We will address
this criticism hereinafter. It is worth noting that a case comparable toBrazil – Seal Products
(administrative practice in relation to discretionary decisions under an exception to the
measure at issue) was dealt with equally by the European Court of Justice.100 After the
Brazil –Retreaded Tyres case, but before EC – Seal Products, an arbitral tribunal ruled that:
95 Appellate Body Report,United States –Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/
AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, 27 Jan. 2003, para. 298.
96 See Müller-Graff, supra n. 27, at para. 163.
97 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 227 (emphasis added).
98 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.321 (emphasis added).
99 Gracia Marín Durán, supra n. 59, at 470, 480; Rachel Harris & Gillian Moon, GATT Article XX and
Human Rights: What Do We Know from the First 20 Years 16 Melb. J. Int’l L. 432, 458 f (2015); Howse,
Langille & Sykes, supra n. 24, at 123.
100 Case 27/80, Fietje [1980], para. 14.
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There are two elements that require to be analyzed to determine whether a state’s act was
unreasonable: the existence of a rational policy; and the reasonableness of the act of the state
in relation to the policy. A rational policy is taken by a state following a logical (good sense)
explanation and with the aim of addressing a public interest matter. Nevertheless, a rational
policy is not enough to justify all the measures taken by a state in its name. A challenged
measure must also be reasonable. That is, there needs to be an appropriate correlation
between the state’s public policy objective and the measure adopted to achieve it. This has
to do with the nature of the measure and the way it is implemented.101
The references to the ‘correlation between the state’s public policy objective
and the measure adopted to achieve it’ and ‘the way it is implemented’ are
reminiscent of the case law of the Appellate Body. This is another example of
how international trade and investment law cross-fertilize each other.
In Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, the respondent invoking Article XX
GATT sought to justify its import licensing regimes relating to horticultural
and animal products, inter alia, on grounds of public health (food safety and
food security, subparagraph (b))102 and public morals (Halal religious food laws,
subparagraph (a)).103 Under the chapeau, the panel found that the true aim of
the respondent’s licensing regimes was self-sufficiency regarding the foodstuffs
covered.104 In short, since self-sufficiency is not listed in the subparagraphs of
Article XX GATT as an accepted ground of justification, the panel concluded
that a rational connection is lacking.105 This replicates the approach taken by
the Appellate Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres106 and was not addressed in the
appellate review.
3.3[d] Chapeau and Non-WTO Law
In the author’s view, an explanation should be allowed to differ from the grounds of
justification in the subparagraphs and still be considered reasonable.107 In the case of
EC – Seal Products, an animal welfare measure sought to consider the competing
interests of indigenous communities in an exception clause.108 The Appellate Body
took the stance that the respondent should have demonstrated ‘how the discrimina-
tion resulting from the manner in which the [measure is applied] can be reconciled
with, or is related to, the policy objective of addressing EU public moral concerns
101 AES v. Hungary (II) (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22) (Award, 23 Sept. 2010), paras 10.3.7–10.3.9.
102 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, paras 7.607, 7.662, 7.722, 7.752, 7.778.
103 Ibid., paras 7.637, 7.640, 7.694.
104 Ibid., para. 7.822.
105 Ibid., para. 7.824.
106 Ibid., paras 7.817, 7.823. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 227.
107 Pro Marín Durán, supra n. 59, at 477.
108 Art. 3(1) of the Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
Sept. 2009 on trade in seal products.
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regarding seal welfare’.109 However, the salient point is that under certain circum-
stances indigenous interests, according to the assessment of the European legislature,
can trump animal welfare. In such a situation, as pointed out by Marín Durán, ‘it is
simply pointless to ask whether the reasons given for the discrimination resulting
from that exception are rationally connected to the measure’s main objective’.110 It is
the very nature of an exception to go against the objective of the measure. Shaffer
and Pabian submit that:
by examining the discriminatory impact of the European Union’s application of the [indi-
genous communities] exception, the Appellate Body suggested… that the exception would
otherwise have been fine even though it did not advance the underlying objective of
protecting public morals concerns regarding seal welfare… It appears to be moving toward
accommodating any legitimate regulatory purposes under the chapeau (such as the protection of
the rights of indigenous communities) so long as the underlying measure falls within one of
the policy objectives listed in Article XX(a)–(j) …111
An alternate approach would have been to recognize as ‘public morals’ not individual
interests (animal welfare, indigenous interests) but the outcome of the legislative
weighing-up as such, i.e. the regulatory compromise between those competing
interests. Indeed, there are many more legitimate explanations, not just the ones
enumerated in the subparagraphs. A reasonable explanation may be derived from
other sources of international law such as indigenous peoples’ rights. This opens up
the chapeau for an inflow of other regulatory purposes acknowledged in interna-
tional law. On that reading, the chapeau becomes a gateway for the consideration of
other rules of international law, thus making WTO law more amenable to public
international law. When the international community recognizes a particular reg-
ulatory purpose as legitimate, this should be dispositive for WTO adjudicatory
bodies, especially if the respective rule of international law is binding upon the
complainant (venire contra factum proprium).
In EC – Seal Products, the Inuit exception could be backed up by international
law relating to indigenous rights, such as the Convention concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries112 and the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.113 When a particular domestic policy is prompted by an
international law obligation, this is a strong indication that the policy is not for
109 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.320 (emphasis added).
110 Marín Durán, supra n. 59, at 475 f.
111 Gregory Shaffer & David Pabian, World Trade Organization – Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade –
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – Discrimination – Protection of Public Morals Regarding Animal
Welfare – Indigenous Communities, 109 Am. J. Int’l. L. 154, 160 (2015) (emphasis in original).
112 Art. 23(1) of the ILO ‘Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries’ (adopted 27 Jun. 1989, entered into force 5 Sept. 1991) 1650 UNTS 383.
113 Art. 20(1) of the UNGA Res 61/295 ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples’ (13 Sept. 2007) GAOR 61st Session Supp. 49 vol. 3, 15.
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protectionist reasons. These international law instruments mirror public morals not
only in the respondent but internationally. In this vein, international benchmarks can
be used to confirm the genuineness of a defence.114 The problemwith themeasure at
issue in EC – Seal Products was that indigenous communities located in the territory
of the complainant were, for no good reason, treated differently from indigenous
communities living in another territory.115 Once this was rectified, the Inuit excep-
tion could stand.116 Moreover, indigenous rights are not absolute but limited by
competing legitimate policy objectives such as animal welfare. Hence one of the
criteria to be taken into account according to the amended exception is the manner
in which the hunt is conducted.117
Also, the arbitrariness test may entail a comparison of laws, because should a
measure like the measure at issue have been adopted by a number of other states, such
a finding would militate against a determination of arbitrariness. In Noble Ventures v.
Romania, the arbitral tribunal denied arbitrariness on the grounds that ‘Such pro-
ceedings are provided for in all legal systems and for much the same reasons… [The]
situation … would have justified the initiation of comparable proceedings in most
other countries.’118 An argumentation of this kind is not unknown in WTO law.
The panel inUS –Gambling referred to the laws of other Members to corroborate its
finding that certain restrictions on gambling are in conformity with public morals.119
3.4 DISGUISED RESTRICTION
The chapeau mentions ‘discrimination’ and ‘restriction’ and thus alludes to the two
most prominent barriers to trade (aside from customs duties). The prohibitions of
discrimination and restrictions reflect different levels of market integration. The
Appellate Body in US – Gasoline established that ‘restriction’ within the chapeau is
the broader concept and includes ‘discrimination’.120 From this it follows that its
scope goes beyond quantitative restrictions121 and also applies to discriminatory
measures. Against Lo,122 a ‘restriction’ within the meaning of the chapeau is not
only a transgression of the national treatment obligation; it also concerns non-
114 Howse, Langille & Sykes, supra n. 24, at 119.
115 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.337. For a succinct summary of the Appellate Body
reasoning, see Matsushita & others, supra n. 45, at 729.
116 European Commission, Trade in Seal Products (5 Oct. 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodi
versity/animal_welfare/seals/seal_hunting.htm (accessed 12 Feb. 2018).
117 Art. 3(1)(c). Consolidated version of the amended Regulation available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02009R1007-20151018&qid=1489446929899.
118 Noble Ventures v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11) (Award, 12 Oct. 2005), para. 178.
119 Panel Report, US – Gambling, paras 6.470–6.473.
120 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 25.
121 Art. XI GATT, Art. XVI GATS.
122 Lo, supra n. 33, at 126.
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discriminatory limitations on market access. The same holds true for European
primary law.123 By the same token, the Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes case
exemplifies that arbitrary discrimination can not only exist between foreign pro-
ducts/traders but also in relation to domestic ones.124 Both the MFN as well as the
national treatment limb are encompassed.
In sum, every discrimination restricts trade (namely to the detriment of the
Member discriminated against), but not every restriction is perforce discrimi-
natory; a non-discriminatory measure may have adverse effects, i.e. be restric-
tive, on foreign traders. A restriction is tantamount to a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements.125 The Appellate Body
observed in US – Shrimp that non-compliance with the chapeau would ‘distort
and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the
Members themselves in that Agreement’.126 Therefore, the term ‘restriction’
captures the entire remit of the chapeau. Again, the crux of the matter is the
attributive adjective ‘disguised’.
There is agreement that covert protectionism is prohibited. What is
controversial is how to determine that. As a preliminary point, it should be
noted that it does not matter whether the measure at issue was announced or
not. Under WTO law, mere state conduct is subject to scrutiny.127 If the
underlying legal basis is in writing, or if there is one in the first place, is
immaterial for state conduct to come under the jurisdiction of the WTO
adjudicating bodies.128 ‘Measure’ is the broadest possible term to describe the
subject matter of a case, its cause.129
The European Court of Justice contemplates ‘the real aim’ of the measure at
issue.130 According to Bossche and Prévost, a ‘disguised restriction’ is given when
‘the design, architecture or structure of the measure at issue reveals that this measure
does in fact not pursue the legitimate policy objectives on which the provisional
justification was based but, in fact, pursues trade-restrictive (i.e. protectionist)
objectives’.131 But this has been taken into account under the subparagraphs, notably
the necessity test. That test involves an appraisal of whether the measure at issue
makes a contribution to the achievement of the policy objective put forward by the
123 Bröhmer, supra n. 77, para. 51.
124 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 7.815 (not appealed).
125 See Art. 3.8 DSU.
126 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 159.
127 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, 9 Jan. 2004, para. 81.
128 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins (‘Zeroing’), WT/DS294/AB/R, 9 May 2006, paras 192 f.
129 See Arts 4.4 and 6.2 DSU.
130 Case 40/82, Commission v. United Kingdom (Newcastle Disease) [1984] ECR 283, para. 37.
131 Peter Van den Bossche & Denise Prévost, Essentials of WTO Law 104 (CUP 2016).
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respondent.132 Just like in European Union law, a disguised restriction will either not
be necessary or not be related to the stated policy objective and therefore, in most
cases, fall through at that stage.133 Bartels specifies that the term ‘disguised’, in the
present context, denotes ‘measures for which an improper purpose is “disguised” by
an ostensibly legitimate purpose’.134 An example from EU law would be if a trade-
mark owner (mis)uses its trademark to foreclose repackaged parallel imports from the
market of the respondent and the national trademark law of the respondent provides
for that misuse.135
Lo contends that ‘If there has already been an effect of protecting domestic
production arising from the measure, GATT Article XX should not serve as a
defense …, even though there is no intention to misrepresent or to deceive other
countries or traders.’136 For Lo, ‘protective effect’ is the determinative criterion.137
But what if a measure that pursues a legitimate purpose has the protection of
domestic production as a side effect? Lo wants to examine under the heading of
‘protective effect’ ‘whether a competitive condition has been changed’.138
However, Lo’s interpretation does not add anything, as adverse effects on the
competitive relationship will already have been found at the infringement stage.
4 ORDER OF ANALYSIS
The Appellate Body is adamant that the subparagraphs be examined prior to the
chapeau.139 Bartels counters that the order of analysis should be determined by
judicial economy.140 The author agrees with Bartels in that there is no strict legal
requirement to begin the legal analysis with the subparagraphs. Furthermore, it is fair
to qualify the requirements in the chapeau as ‘horizontal’, as they apply to all the
subparagraphs, thereby specifying the (necessity/relationship) tests contained
therein.141 That said, it is equally true that in most cases it makes sense to identify
the policy objective (allegedly) pursued by the measure at issue first before engaging
with the other requirements of the exception clause.142 As the Appellate Body put it:
132 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/
DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 10 Jan. 2001, para. 164.
133 Cf. Müller-Graff, supra n. 27, at para. 171.
134 Bartels, supra n. 13, at 125.
135 Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139700>; Case C-143/00, Boehringer et
al. v. Swingward and Dowelhurst [2002] ECR I-3759.
136 Lo, supra n. 33, at 121, 123.
137 Ibid., at 121.
138 Ibid., at 130.
139 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 119.
140 Bartels, supra n. 13, at 124.
141 Ibid.
142 See also Marín Durán, supra n. 59, at 485, with respect to Art. 2.1 TBT Agreement.
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‘considering first the measure at issue under the applicable paragraphs of Article XX
provides panels with the necessary tools to assess that measure under the chapeau of
Article XX’.143 The reason is that the importance of the objective pursued also
matters for purposes of the chapeau:144 the stringency with which the chapeau is
applied in a particular case is influenced by the importance of the non-trade values at
stake.145 For some exceptions are more prone to abuse than others.146 Just think of
the defence of censorship laws under the public morals exception in
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products147 as compared to a universally shared
value such as human health. The Appellate Body alluded to that inUS – Shrimpwhen
stating that ‘The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is
not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.’148 Another reason
advanced by the Appellate Body is that non-compliance with the chapeau has
different implications for the implementation of a ruling than a finding that the
measure at issue is not provisionally justified.149 In Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes, the Appellate Body thus reaffirmed the established order of analysis, with
the caveat that a departure from this order is not, ‘for that reason alone’, tantamount
to ‘a reversible legal error’.150
5 BURDEN OF PROOF
According to the Appellate Body, it is incumbent upon the responding party to
demonstrate that themeasure at issue is applied consistently with the chapeau.151 The
Appellate Body acknowledged that ‘That is, of necessity, a heavier task than that
involved in showing that an exception, such as Article XX(g), encompasses the
measure at issue.’152 For instance, if a respondent asserts that conditions are not the
same, the burden of proof rests with the respondent in that regard.153 Conversely, at
143 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 5.96.
144 Ibid., para. 5.98.
145 See Ulrike Will, The Extra-Jurisdictional Effects of Environmental Measures in the WTO Law Balancing
Process, 50 J. World Trade 611, 624 (2016); Davies, supra n. 42, at 523.
146 Cf. Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and
the Undermining Mole, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 43, 74 (2008).
147 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, 19 Jan. 2010, para. 205.
148 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 159.
149 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 5.100.
150 Ibid., paras 5.100 f.
151 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 22 f; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para.
5.297.
152 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 23.
153 Van den Bossche & Prévost, supra n. 131, at 103.
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the infringement stage, the burden of proof is on the complainant to establish
inconsistency with a WTO provision.154
Following the suggested approach to align ‘discrimination’/‘restriction’ in
the chapeau with the substantive obligations has implications for the burden
of proof as well. The author argues that, with respect to burden of proof
under the chapeau, a more differentiated approach is apposite and indeed
taken: Initially, it is the complainant who has to show arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction prima facie. Then the burden shifts to the respon-
dent to refute such assertion, primarily by demonstrating a rational connec-
tion with one of the policy objectives contained in the subparagraphs.155
Next, the complainant can disprove this connection by revealing the ‘actual’
objective behind the measure at issue. Gaines first proposed a presumption of
compliance with the chapeau with a view to reducing the chapeau’s
stringency.156 In short, it would be on the complainant to establish non-
compliance with the chapeau first. This is also in line with the accepted
precept that ‘the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the
respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof’.157 Here, the assertion
(arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction) is made by the complainant.
Consequently, it should be on the complainant to establish where the arbi-
trary application or disguised restriction lies. A similar shift in the burden of
proof is recognized under the necessity test: it is not on the respondent ‘to
demonstrate that there are no reasonably available alternatives that would
achieve its objectives’.158
Au contraire, if one insisted that the responding party showed that the measure
at issue does not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion, one would force it to prove a negative. Although language can be twisted
(consistency with the chapeau as opposed to non-existence of arbitrariness or
disguised restrictions),159 the Appellate Body in Japan – Agricultural Products II
deemed the requirement to prove a negative ‘an impossible and, therefore, erroneous
burden of proof’160 and in US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada) ‘an
154 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/
R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 13 Feb. 1998, para. 98.
155 Appellate BodyReport, Brazil –Retreaded Tyres, para. 227; Appellate BodyReport, EC – Seal Products,
paras 5.306, 5.318.
156 Gaines, supra n. 48, at 852.
157 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, 23 May 1997, at 14.
158 Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 319 (emphasis in original).
159 See Michelle Grando, Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement 194 (OUP 2009).
160 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, 19 Mar.
1999, para. 137.
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unduly high burden’.161 The present situation is comparable to the situation in
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents in respect of which the panel held:
The third condition of Article 30 [TRIPS Agreement] is the requirement that the proposed
exception must not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner …’
Although Canada, as the party asserting the exception provided for in Article 30, bears the
burden of proving compliance with the conditions of that exception, the order of proof is
complicated by the fact that the condition involves proving a negative. One cannot
demonstrate that no legitimate interest of the patent owner has been prejudiced until one
knows what claims of legitimate interest can be made.162
In terms of litigation strategy, both disputants are advised to articulate in their
submissions the objective(s) of the impugned measure as they see it.
In Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, after the co-complainants, New Zealand
and the United States, had established that ‘the actual policy objective behind all
these measures is to achieve self-sufficiency through domestic production by way of
restricting and, at times, prohibiting imports’,163 the respondent could not show that,
in truth, the measures’ policy objective is ‘rationally related’ to the ones in the
subparagraphs.164 In that case, the panel did not need to decide whether food security
would be considered a legitimate ground of justification in terms of an exception.
6 POTENTIAL OF THE CHAPEAU FOR PROCEDURAL
GUARANTEES
6.1 FOCUS ON PROCEDURE
6.1[a] Application of the Measure
It is settled case law of the Appellate Body that the chapeau deals with the application
of the measure at issue, and ‘not so much… its specific contents as such’.165 That is,
the Appellate Body does not only dissect the text of a measure (under the subpar-
agraphs), but also looks at how the measure is implemented by domestic authorities
(under the chapeau). Therefore, administrative procedures implementing a govern-
ment measure are subject to judicial scrutiny in accordance with the chapeau. The
Appellate Body deduced this bifurcation of analysis from the chapeau’s wording (‘not
applied in a manner which’). It concluded that ‘discrimination results … when the
161 Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood
Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW and Corr.1,
9 May 2006, para. 130.
162 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 7 Apr. 2000, para.
7.60.
163 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 7.822.
164 Ibid., para. 7.824 (not appealed).
165 Since Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 22.
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application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appro-
priateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting
countries’.166 The Appellate Body contrasts here the regulatory programmewith the
application of the measure at issue.
It is a common feature for statutes to be implemented by authorities and that the
decisions of the authorities are guided by administrative regulations. There is a
distinction the framers might have thought of when drafting the chapeau: the distinc-
tion between legislation and law enforcement.167 The Appellate Body specified in
US – Shrimp that the latter does not only imply an examination of the operating
provisions of the measure at issue, including concomitant administrative regulations,
but an examination of its actual application in practice.168 In short, the chapeau is
concerned with the method by which government action should take place.
The distinction between administrative and substantive rules appears to be
engrained in the WTO legal system. Article X GATT, too, distinguishes between
the administration and the substantive content of measures.169 The Appellate Body
in EC – Selected Customs Matters noted that ‘Under Article X:3(a), a distinction must
be made between the legal instrument being administered and the legal instrument
that regulates the application or implementation of that instrument.’170 It further
ruled that ‘the substantive content of legal instruments that regulate the application or
implementation of laws, regulations, decisions, and administrative rulings of the kind
described in Article X:1 can be challenged under Article X:3(a)’.171 The same holds
true for the chapeau. However, because the Appellate Body also scrutinizes excep-
tions to the measure at issue under the chapeau,172 the distinction between the
subparagraphs (i.e. the substance of the measure) and the chapeau (i.e. the application
of the measure) becomes blurred.
6.1[b] Rule of Law
Although the chapeau contains ‘both substantive and procedural requirements’,173 it
follows from the above considerations that its focus is on the procedural aspects of the
measure at issue, according to some commentators, in particular, on due process and
166 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 165.
167 See Appellate Body, US – Gambling, para. 356.
168 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 160.
169 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry
Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, 23 Jul. 1998, para. 115; Appellate Body Report, European Communities –
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 25 Sept. 1997, para. 200.
170 Appellate BodyReport,European Communities – Selected CustomsMatters,WT/DS315/AB/R, 11 Dec.
2006, para. 200.
171 Ibid., para. 210.
172 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.328.
173 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 160.
STRINGENT THRESHOLD OR GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT 163
transparency.174 Bartels posits that ‘treating arbitrary discrimination in terms of due
process is at odds with the historical background to the chapeau’.175 That said, in
many complex cases the procedure is used as a proxy to assess the legality of
substantive law. This is a trend observed in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice.176 The definition of arbitrariness, as seen at the heart of the chapeau
analysis, seems to corroborate that. Additionally, the International Court of Justice
correlated that concept with ‘due process’ by defining ‘arbitrariness’ as the opposite
of the rule of law: ‘It is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks,
or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety.’177 This is in line with the Appellate
Body reading of arbitrariness as an evasion of the law. The author recalls that,
according to the Appellate Body, ‘the chapeau serves to ensure that Members’ rights
to avail themselves of exceptions are [not] exercised … as a means to circumvent one
Member’s obligations towards other WTO Members’.178
6.2 DUE PROCESS
Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘due process’ as ‘[t]he conduct of legal proceedings
according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of
private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with
the power to decide the case.’179 The Oxford Dictionaries Online emphasize the
impartiality of the decision-maker.180 The Appellate Body concretized the principle
of due process for purposes of WTO law. It covers a right to be heard, transparency
of procedures, completion of procedures within a reasonable period of time, and the
possibility of review.181
6.2[a] Link to Article X GATT and Article VI GATS
The Appellate Body stated in US – Shrimp that ‘rigorous compliance with the
fundamental requirements of due process should be required in the application and
174 Ala’i, supra n. 20, at 1027; Ioannidis, supra n. 84, at 1197, 1199, 1202; Matsushita & others, supra n. 45,
at 748.
175 Bartels, supra n. 13, at 122.
176 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies & Giorgio Monti, European Union Law 894 (3rd ed., CUP 2014).
177 Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, [1989] ICJRep. 15,
76 para. 128.
178 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 215 (emphasis added).
179 Garner, ‘due process’.
180 Oxford Dictionaries Online, Due Process, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/due_process
(accessed 12 Feb. 2018).
181 See also Andrew Mitchell & David Heaton, The Inherent Jurisdiction of WTO Tribunals: The Select
Application of Public International LawRequired by the Judicial Function, 31Mich. J. Int’l L. 559, 586 (2010);
Chalmers, Davies & Monti, supra n. 176, at 922–24. For the evolution of international due process, see
Kotuby Jr. & Sobota, supra n. 21, at 54–73.
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administration of a measure which purports to be an exception to the treaty
obligations’.182 In other words, the Appellate Body reads ‘due process requirements’
into the chapeau. Ala’i infers from this that the case law relating to Article X:3(a)
GATT is applicable to the effect that a measure would be found arbitrary within the
meaning of the chapeau if it was not administered ‘in a uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner’.183 The US – Shrimp ruling seems to support this inference.184
The same must apply mutatis mutandis to the chapeau of Article XIV GATS with
respect to Article VI:1 GATS.
Two things should be noted: First, Article X:3(a) GATT can also be invoked
independently.185 That is, a measure the substance of which is WTO consistent can
still be challenged under WTO law on the basis that it is administered in a manner
that disregards administrative due process. Moreover, whereas Article X GATT
concerns governance in relation to a Member’s own citizens, too,186 WTO adjudi-
cating bodies, under the chapeau, only review measures taken in relation to foreign
traders.
6.2[b] Right to be Heard
InUS – Shrimp, the Appellate Body reprimanded the respondent for not providing a
‘formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any
arguments that may be made against it, in the course of the certification process
before a decision to grant or to deny certification is made’.187 From this a right to be
heard by the competent authorities can be distilled, including a right to submit
evidence.
6.2[c] Transparency
Transparency is pivotal to good governance, as it enhances the legitimacy of the
respective entity.188 This principle comprises several aspects. First of all, it involves
the duty on the part of domestic authorities to grant access to relevant information,
182 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 182.
183 Padideh Ala’i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good
Governance, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 779, 801 (2008). For the history of Art. X GATT, see Silke Steiner &
Friedl Weiss, Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of the WTO, in International
Law and Developing Countries: Essays in Honour of Kamal Hossain 270 f (Sharif Bhuiyan, Philippe Sands &
Nico Schrijver eds, Brill 2014).
184 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras 182 f.
185 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, paras 190–287.
186 Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear,
WT/DS24/AB/R, 25 Feb. 1997, at 21 (‘whether of domestic or foreign nationality’).
187 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 180.
188 Steve Charnovitz,TheWTO and Cosmopolitics, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 675, 679 (2004); Salacuse, supra n. 50,
at 260.
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secondly, to give reasons for their decisions, and thirdly, for those reasons to have a
rational basis. This entails, fourthly, the duty to use objective and clear criteria.
6.2[c][i] Access to Information
The WTO Glossary defines ‘transparency’ as the ‘[d]egree to which trade
policies and practices, and the process by which they are established, are open
and predictable.’189 The Preamble to the Revised Agreement on Government
Procurement recognizes ‘the importance of transparent measures regarding
government procurement, of carrying out procurements in a transparent and
impartial manner and of avoiding conflicts of interest and corrupt practices, in
accordance with applicable international instruments, such as the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption’.190 Furthermore, Part B of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides that ‘Members recognize the
inherent value of domestic transparency of government decision-making on
trade policy matters for both Members’ economies and the multilateral trading
system’. The Appellate Body stated in the context of Article X:2 GATT that
‘Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by govern-
mental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens, should
have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such
measures.’191 The principle of transparency thus denotes the access to and
sharing of information, for example, about market opportunities such as
government contracts.192
6.2[c][ii] Duty to Give Reasons
The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp went on to criticize that ‘Countries whose
applications are denied also do not receive notice of such denial… or of the reasons
for the denial.’193 The same duty to give reasons exists in European Union law: ‘In
order to enable the impartiality of the authorisation procedures to be monitored, it is
also necessary for the competent authorities to base each of their decisions on
reasoning which is accessible to the public, stating precisely the reasons for which,
as the case may be, authorisation has been refused.’194
189 WTO, Glossary, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm (accessed 12
Feb. 2018).
190 Recital 6.
191 Appellate Body Report, US – Underwear, at 21.
192 Ala’i, supra n. 183, at 780, fn. 6; Steiner & Weiss, supra n. 183, at 262.
193 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 180 (footnotes omitted).
194 Case C-470/11, Garkalns, Judgment of 19 Jul. 2012, para. 43.
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6.2[c][iii] Objectivity and Clarity of Criteria
As seen, Article X:3(a) GATT bears upon the exegesis of the chapeau. The
requirement of uniform administration in Article X:3(a) GATT was interpreted
by the panel inUS – Stainless Steel as meaning ‘uniformity of treatment in respect of
persons similarly situated’.195 This is reminiscent of the chapeau element ‘where the
same conditions prevail’ and shows how the provisions are interrelated. In this
connection, the question of whether the discretion of authorities implementing
national legislation is unfettered or constrained is relevant. In EC – Seal Products,
the Appellate Body took issue with ‘the ambiguities in the criteria of the [measure]
and the broad discretion that the recognized bodies consequently enjoy in applying
these criteria’.196 Similarly, in Occidental v. Ecuador (I), an arbitral tribunal found
arbitrariness on account of ‘confusion and lack of clarity’.197 Further lessons can be
learnt from European Union law. For instance, the European Court of Justice held
inWatts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust that ‘a system of prior authorisation…must in
any event be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in
advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’
discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily’.198 It follows that the precept of
transparency implies the duty to apply objective and clear criteria.199
6.2[d] Completion of Procedures Within a Reasonable Period of Time and Possibility of Review
The panel in Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) deemed delays in a domestic review
process to be unreasonable.200 Furthermore, the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp
disapproved of the fact that ‘No procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of
an application is provided.’201 By the same token, the European Court of Justice in
Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust ruled that national procedures must ensure that ‘a
request for authorisation will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a
reasonable time and refusals to grant authorisation must also be capable of being
challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings’.202
195 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel
Sheet and Strip from Korea, WT/DS179/R, 1 Feb. 2001, para. 6.51 (emphasis added).
196 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.328. For EU law, see Case C-470/11, Garkalns,
para. 46.
197 Occidental v. Ecuador (I) (LCIA Case No. UN3467) (Award, 1 Jul. 2004), para. 163.
198 Case C-372/04,Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 116 (citations omitted).
199 Note that Art. VI:1 GATS uses the term ‘objective’ instead of ‘uniform’.
200 Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/DS371/R,
15 Jul. 2011, para. 7.969.
201 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 180.
202 Case C-372/04, Watts, para. 116 (citations omitted). See also Case C-24/00, Commission v. France
(French Vitamins) [2004] ECR I-1277, para. 26.
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6.2[e] Protection of Confidential Business Information
Moreover, government authorities are under an obligation to protect confidential
business information received from foreign traders against disclosure.203
6.3 CONCLUSIONS
Steiner and Weiss comment that ‘the WTO has already made considerable progress
in securing transparency, albeit as a principle rather than as an enforceable right’.204 But
government measures are scrutinized in the light of the chapeau. The chapeau gives
the principle of due process, which includes the principle of transparency, teeth, as
the administration of measures can be challenged before the WTO. Article X:3(a)
GATT coins administrative due process for WTO purposes. As a consequence, the
chapeau forces Members to have procedural safeguards in place, thereby promoting
good governance, notably good administration, domestically.205
Having said that, even if a measure fails the chapeau test, it can still be saved by
the respondent improving its administration. In that sense, it is fair to say that ‘the
Chapeau is concerned with under-regulation’.206 This is different when the measure
at issue founders on the subparagraphs. That is, at the end of the day, the chapeau
does not ultimately decide whether a government measure stands or falls.207
7 POTENTIAL OF THE CHAPEAU FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE
While due process is concerned with procedural fairness, some aspects of it can be
extrapolated for the benefit of good governance in general. According to the UN
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the principle of good
governance encompasses eight characteristics: ‘participatory, consensus oriented,
accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive
and follows the rule of law’.208
The indirect influence of the chapeau can be seen in the EU emissions trading
system.With regard to aviation emissions, an international agreement was negotiated
203 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.94.
204 Steiner & Weiss, supra n. 183, at 287 (emphasis added).
205 See also Ioannidis, supra n. 84, at 1197.
206 Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the Application of the EU’s Emission Trading System to Aviation, 23
Eur. J. Int’l L. 429, 452 (2012) (emphasis in original).
207 Ming Du, Permitting Moral Imperialism? The Public Morals Exception to Free Trade at the Bar of the World
Trade Organization, 50 J. World Trade 675, 694 (2016).
208 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, What Is Good Governance? (2009), ht
tp://www.unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance (accessed 12 Feb. 2018). For the develop-
ment of the principle of good governance, seeMatthias Kötter,Good Governance 553 ff (Philipp Dann,
Stefan Kadelbach & Markus Kaltenborn eds, Nomos 2014).
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under the auspices of the International Civil AviationOrganization, allowing the EU
to maintain a ‘cap and trade’ system,209 which some considered at odds with the
chapeau.210 Prior to the multilateral agreement, the European Union limited the
application of its emissions trading system to the European Economic Area.211
7.1 CONSISTENCY
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the principle of good govern-
ance requires that ‘the public authorities must act in good time and in an appropriate
and above all consistent manner’.212 Furthermore, it imposes ‘on the authorities an
obligation to act promptly in correcting their mistake’.213 A requirement of con-
sistency can be deduced from the prohibition of arbitrariness in the chapeau.214
Contrariwise, the chapeau calls for a certain degree of flexibility in the administration
of the measure at issue so as to ‘allow for [an] inquiry into the appropriateness of the
regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in … exporting countries’.215 In
short, to be compliant, a measure must make allowance for special circumstances in
exporting countries.216 In addition, as exemplified in EC – Seal Products, some
inconsistency or exceptions are testament to the fact that domestic legislatures are
mandated to weigh up competing interests.217
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that ‘rigidity and inflexibility’
constitute a case of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of
the chapeau.218 In casu, the national authorities lacked discretion to apply the
measure at issue in a WTO-compliant manner. Product life cycle laws, such as the
EU Packaging Directive,219 are another case in point.220 Conversely, if the
209 European Commission, Reducing Emissions from Aviation (12 Feb. 2018) Climate Action, https://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation_en (accessed 12 Feb. 2018); European Commission, The
EU Emissions Trading System (11 Feb. 2018) Climate Action, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/et
s_en (accessed 12 Feb. 2018).
210 Matsushita & others, supra n. 45, at 767.
211 EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway.
212 ECtHR, Rysovskyy v. Ukraine, App. No. 29979/04, 20 Oct. 2011, para. 70.
213 Ibid., para. 71.
214 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.584. See also Van den Bossche & Prévost, supra n. 131, at 110;
Andrew Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of ‘Necessity’ in
International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 Chi. J. Int’l L. 93, 136 (2013).
215 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 165.
216 Ibid., para. 177.
217 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.319. See also Robert Howse & Joanna Langille,
Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified
by Noninstrumental Moral Values, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 367, 419, 429 (2012).
218 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras 165, 177.
219 European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 Dec. 1994 on packaging and packaging
waste. A consolidated version is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/packaging/leg
is.htm.
220 Matsushita & others, supra n. 45, at 753.
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discretion is too broad, as the ambiguous exception in EC – Seal Products, the
measure might founder on the chapeau for that very same reason.221
These seemingly contradictory propositions can be reconciled, however, by
focusing on the rationale given by the implementing authority: what has to be
consistent is the criteria used to come to a decision. As long as the implementing
authority applies the criteria consistently, the outcome may differ depending on the
conditions in the exporting country. This becomes apparent from comparing the
chapeau with Article 5.5 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),222 which uses similar wording in relation
to levels of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. Article 5.5 provides as follows:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or to animal and
plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the
levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.223
This does not mean that a Member could not change the criteria it applies (provided
the new criteria are objective and clear). Mere departure from ‘established policy’ is
not sufficient to find non-compliance with the chapeau. In US – Stainless Steel
(Korea), the panel had ‘grave doubts’ about freezing a Member’s national legal
framework in the sense of a stabilization clause.224 Akin to the line of argument in
investment law,225 the interest of foreign traders in stability is pitted against the
respondent’s right to regulate.
7.2 PROPORTIONALITY
7.2[a] The Test
The ‘line of equilibrium’ language that the Appellate Body uses to describe its
interpretive approach to the chapeau is evocative of a proportionality test. The
principle of proportionality is a judicial tool employed to balance out competing
societal values and interests.226 It structures the legal analysis227 and is characterized
221 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.328.
222 WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (signed 15 Apr. 1994,
entered into force 1 Jan. 1995) 1867 UNTS 493.
223 Emphasis added.
224 Panel Report, US – Stainless Steel (Korea), para. 6.50.
225 Dolzer & Schreuer, supra n. 50, at 149.
226 Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and
the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 J. Int’l Econ. L. 223, 226 (2012); Jacco Bomhoff,
Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional)
Law, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 555, 574 (2008).
227 Henckels, supra n. 226, at 228 f.
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by the following stages: (1) legitimate public welfare objective, (2) suitability, (3)
necessity, and (4) proportionality stricto sensu.228
The first question is if the measure is covered by one of the subparagraphs. All
policy objectives listed in an exception clause are, by definition, legitimate so that, as
long as the measure falls within the ambit of one of the subparagraphs, the legitimacy
of the policy objective can be assumed. It is beyond dispute that protecting, for
example, public morals or public health is a legitimate policy objective. In the second
stage, the adjudicatory body examines whether the measure at issue is capable of
promoting the pursued policy objective.229 This is equivalent to the ‘relating to’
element in Article XX GATT.230 In the third stage, the necessity test, the issue is
whether there are less trade-restrictive alternative measures that achieve the same
level of protection.231
Proportionality stricto sensu, finally, ‘involves an assessment of whether the
effects of a measure are … excessive in relation to the interests involved’.232 Here,
the pursued policy objective must not be out of proportion to the severity of the
interference. That is, at this stage, the adjudicatory body questions the relative
significance of the pursued policy objective. It weighs up the public welfare gain
of the measure against the interference caused.233 In other words, it conducts its own
cost-benefit analysis. Andenas and Zleptnig put this last stage in a nutshell: ‘Themore
intense the restriction of a particular interest, the more important the justification for
the countervailing objective needs to be.’234 In the present context, the domestic
benefits the measure at issue brings about would be balanced against the foreign costs
in reduced trade.235
It is disputed whether international courts and tribunals are legitimized to
scrutinize this final step. At what stage the legal analysis stops determines how strict
the standard of review of a particular forum is.236 The European Court of Justice read
the principle of proportionality into Article 36, second sentence, TFEU, which is, in
228 Ibid., at 227; Peter Van den Bossche, Looking for Proportionality inWTOLaw, 35 L.I.E.I. 283, 285 (2008)
(not counting the ‘legitimate public welfare objective’ step separately); Kotuby Jr. & Sobota, supra n.
21, at 114.
229 Van den Bossche, supra n. 228, at 285.
230 For the definition of ‘relating to’, see Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 141; Appellate Body
Report,China –Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R,WT/
DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R, 22 Feb. 2012, para. 355.
231 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 156; Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos,
para. 172.
232 Van den Bossche, supra n. 228, at 285.
233 Henckels, supra n. 226, at 228.
234 Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law: In Comparative Perspective, 42 Tex. Int’l L.
J. 371, 390 (2007).
235 Donald Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of
Cost–Benefit Balancing, 6 World Trade Rev. 347, 350, 366 (2007).
236 Henckels, supra n. 226, at 240, 250, 253.
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terms of wording and purpose, equivalent to the chapeau.237 Kingreen regards the
clause as encapsulating the essence of what is unjustifiable regardless of the legitimacy
of the objectives invoked.238 In other words, arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction could never trump the right to trade. Before addressing the issue of
whether the chapeau also includes proportionality stricto sensu, we have to clarify
one point relating to the necessity test that is of importance here.
7.2[b] Necessity: ‘Less’ or ‘Least’ Restrictive Test?
Aside from ascertaining whether the measure at issue makes a contribution to
the achievement of the avowed policy objective,239 a panel also compares the
measure with alternative measures.240 There is some confusion as to whether
necessity implies a less or least trade-restrictive test.241 This is, however, only a
formulation issue: A Member has to adopt the least trade-restrictive measure to
achieve a particular public welfare objective, but the extent to which the
Member wants to protect that objective is at the Member’s discretion.242 If
there is a less restrictive alternative to achieve the same result, Members are
under an obligation to use it.243 When there is no less restrictive alternative
available to achieve a particular goal, it means that the chosen measure is the
least restrictive. In short, Members have to pursue their public welfare objec-
tives in the most trade-friendly manner possible.
7.2[c] Strict Proportionality
An application of the principle of proportionality stricto sensu would amount to a de
novo review of domestic prioritization decisions. This would override the weighing-
up carried out by national legislatures, thus negating the precept that Members
237 Case 174/82, Sandoz [1983] ECR 2445, para. 18; Case C-13/91 and C-113/91,Debus [1992] ECR I-
3617, para. 16.
238 Thorsten Kingreen, Art. 34–36 AEUV, in EUV/AEUV para. 102 (Christian Calliess & Matthias
Ruffert eds, 5th ed., C.H. Beck 2016).
239 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 150.
240 It is for the complainant to propose alternative measures, Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.261.
241 Regan, supra n. 235, at 348 f, 366 (‘less-restrictive alternative test’); Chad Bown & Joel Trachtman,
Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act, 8 World Trade Rev. 85, 87 f (2009)
(‘least-trade-restrictive-alternative test’); Gebhard Bücheler, Proportionality in Investor-State Arbitration
71 (OUP 2015) (‘least-restrictive means test’).
242 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 168; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 210; Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.200. See also Arts 3.3, 4.1, 5.5, 5.6 SPS
Agreement, recital 6 Preamble to the TBT Agreement.
243 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 156.
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autonomously set the level of protection they aspire to.244 Therefore, Regan is right
in pointing out that ‘these two pronouncements of the Appellate Body – that
measures must be subjected to a balancing test and that Members get to choose
their own level of protection – are logically contradictory’.245 Reid argues that the
Appellate Body in US –Gasoline examined whether ‘the restriction was “dispropor-
tionate” in terms of the costs imposed, when applying the chapeau’.246 In truth, the
Appellate Body criticized the respondent for not taking the cost effects of the
measure on foreigners into account.247
To the author’s mind, WTO adjudicating bodies applying a strict proportion-
ality test would exceed the limits of their institutional competence. National legis-
latures are better equipped to perform the complex reconciliation of competing
societal values and interests.248 Howse and Langille observed with respect to the
public morals exception that:
there is nothing in the text of Article XX(a) that requires, for the invocation of the public
morals exception, that the moral beliefs or values at issue be of such a priority that they trump
all other moral beliefs, values, or social interests. This would render regulatory schemes that
balance or harmonize some beliefs or values with other beliefs or values indefensible in light
of their supposed objective to protect public morals.249
This statement can be generalized for the other grounds of justification. In conclu-
sion, there is, and there should be, no balancing of interests under the chapeau.What
is more, in dubio pro libertate is not a principle that would guide the interpretation of
the exceptions.250 In this regard, the Members are left with a margin of appreciation.
The chapeau does not embody a strict proportionality test.
8 REWORKING THE CHAPEAU
The ambiguities of the chapeau, if falsely interpreted, could lead adjudicatory bodies
to seriously encroach on the Members’ regulatory autonomy, thus amplifying the
tension that exists between international lawmaking and democratic processes at the
national level. This danger is particularly acute in the context of investor-state
dispute settlement where chapeau language is used in international investment
agreements. For the danger not to materialize, the chapeau has to be construed
244 Andenas & Zleptnig, supra n. 234, at 390.
245 Regan, supra n. 235, at 348.
246 Emily Reid, Balancing Human Rights, Environmental Protection and International Trade: Lessons from the EU
Experience 247 (Hart 2015).
247 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 28.
248 Ioannidis, supra n. 84, at 1202; Henckels, supra n. 226, at 250–252; Howse & Langille, supra n. 217, at
428. For the dangers associated with proportionality in general, see Bücheler, supra n. 241, at 62–66.
249 Howse & Langille, supra n. 217, at 418.
250 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 18; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 104.
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narrowly; above all, a strict proportionality test must be ruled out. Ultimately, this
concentration of the chapeau will be conducive to the legitimacy of the world
trading system, for a lower bar guarantees domestic legislatures more latitude.251
As postulated by Davies, ‘For a measure already found to be necessary to be subject to
further review under the chapeau is perhaps indicative of an ordering of values in
favour of trade, which is obviously now anachronistic.’252
Against this, Morgan cautions that discarding the chapeau would result in
‘uncertainty that would surround measures previously found incompatible with
the chapeau’.253 The most radical reading of the chapeau would be a reading akin
to paragraph 1 of Article III GATT, namely as a general principle informing the rest
of the exception, ‘as a guide to understanding and interpreting’ the subparagraphs.254
As a corollary, the chapeau would be elaborated by the specific grounds of justifica-
tion but have no direct application. Then again, for Wells, the chapeau constitutes ‘a
suitable gatekeeper’.255 Rather than discarding it, the language of the chapeau should
be reworked and, where possible, simplified with a view to clarifying its meaning.
The ‘perceived imbalance in the existing rights and obligations under the TBT
Agreement and the GATT’ mooted by the Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products
does not only concern the grounds of justification but also the chapeau.256 It is
unlikely that the Members will amend the WTO Agreement, as hinted at by the
Appellate Body in that case. This should not cause negotiators of FTAs, however, to
perpetuate that ‘perceived imbalance’. On other occasions, too, they clarified the
WTO exceptions they incorporated. For instance, Article 28.3.1 CETA stipulates
that Article XX(b) GATT includes environmental measures and Article XX(g)
includes living resources. The same is true of the CPTPP.257
Other agreements have adopted different formulations of the chapeau. For
instance, Turkey uses a shortened version of the chapeau for general exceptions in
some of its BITs (‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any non-discriminatory
legal measures’).258 The Canada–Korea FTA omits the ‘arbitrary or unjustified
251 See also Ioannidis, supra n. 84, at 1199.
252 Davies, supra n. 42, at 538.
253 Moran, supra n. 11, at 13.
254 Cf. Appellate BodyReport, Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R, 1 Nov. 1996, at 18.
255 Philip Joseph Wells, Unilateralism and Protectionism in the World Trade Organization: The Interpretation of
the Chapeau within GATT Article XX, 13 J.I.T.L.P. 222, 228 (2014).
256 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.129.
257 Art. 29.1.2 TPP.
258 Art. 5(1) of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government
of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments (entered
into force 2 May 2013); Art. 5(1) of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Turkey and the Government of the Gabonese Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments (signed 18 Jul. 2012); Art. 5(1) of the Agreement Between the Government
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discrimination’ language in its chapter on the environment and only speaks of ‘a
disguised restriction on trade or investment between the Parties’.259
9 CONCLUSIONS
The way to address non-trade concerns at theWTO, or any other trading regime for
that matter, is to ensure policy space for national lawmakers. General exception
clauses are pivotal to this. It is the place where the Appellate Body ultimately draws
the line between where the international trade obligation ends and the national
policy space begins. Hence governments should be clear about their requirements. It
is fair to say that, of all the requirements found in exception clauses, the chapeau is the
vaguest, and therefore the most problematic one. On the upside, the chapeau has the
potential to induce Members to comply with good governance standards. At the
same time, it reinforces a global consensus about good governance in the form of
good administration.
In the author’s view, the chapeau constitutes a good faith caveat foreclosing
arbitrary rule-making, not a stringent threshold requirement. We found that an
arbitrariness test is at the heart of the chapeau analysis. Further, the way international
trade and investment law handle the concept of arbitrariness is alike, even the
argument is couched in a similar way. The expression ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’ should be
examined as a whole and the focus should be on arbitrariness as set out above. This
means that the elements ‘unjustifiable’ and ‘between countries where the same
conditions prevail’ can be scrapped, as the instances falling thereunder can be
subsumed under the arbitrariness test. Examples include the shortfall in technical
assistance and shorter phase-in periods as compared to other trading partners from
US – Shrimp.260 This would align the chapeau with Article 36, second sentence,
TFEU, which read as follows: ‘Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.’ Because ‘restriction’ is the broader concept and encom-
passes ‘discrimination’, the latter could be omitted altogether. This would lead to the
following introductory clause:
Subject to the requirement that such measures do not constitute an arbitrary or disguised
restriction on trade [or investment] between the Parties, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures …
of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of The Gambia Concerning the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 12 Mar. 2013).
259 Art. 17.1.3 of the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Korea (entered into
force 1 Jan. 2015).
260 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras 174 f.
STRINGENT THRESHOLD OR GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT 175
This would not amount to a complete redrafting of the chapeau, but rather a more
precise restatement.
To sum up, the Appellate Body sought to come to grips with the chapeau by
confining its scope to the administration of the measure at issue. However, because
the Appellate Body scrutinizes substantive exceptions to the measure under the
chapeau, the distinction between substance and administration of the measure
became blurred. The article presented two alternative approaches to rein in the
chapeau: Firstly, the burden of proof under the chapeau could be redistributed and
lessons could be learnt from the necessity test in this regard. Secondly, negotiators
could simplify theWTO language for purposes of FTAs and BITs. Negotiators could
even go one step further and codify accepted grounds of arbitrariness, such as having
no due regard to facts or foreign interests, in the form of legislative examples. This
would provide treaty interpreters with additional guidance.
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